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Does Rorty have a Blindspot about
Truth?
David Macarthur
1 Richard Rorty has often been criticized as having a blindspot about the normative role
of truth. To give three prominent examples: John McDowell criticizes Rorty for missing
the normativity embedded in the disquotational use of truth;1 Hilary Putnam accuses
Rorty  of  a  sophisticated  relativism,  which  fails  to  take  seriously  the  objective
normativity of truth, the way in which truth transcends communal standards.2 And
Huw Price argues that on Rorty’s view of truth one is unable to make sense of the idea
that  a  speaker,  warranted  by  her  own  lights,  could  improve her  commitments  by
consulting the commitments and justificatory practices of  the wider community.  Of
these Price’s criticism is perhaps the strongest and the one I would like to critically
examine in this paper.3 
2 Variants of Price’s criticism have also been voiced by other well-known philosophers
(e.g. Habermas4) and it is initially quite compelling. If we do not recognize a truth that
transcends our practices and the agreements that are forged within them, then what
could  motivate  us  to  improve  our  commitments  if  they  meet  the  only  operative
standard  in  the  vicinity,  namely,  being  accepted  by  one’s  own  standards,  say,  of
coherence? 
3 My aim in the present paper is twofold: in the first place, I want to respond on Rorty’s
behalf to Price’s conception of where Rorty’s blindspot about truth lies. I shall argue
that  Price’s  criticism  is  off-target  missing  the  perfectionist  character  of  the
justificatory norms that are criterial for truth. Secondly, I want to argue that despite
sidestepping Price’s criticism, Rorty does indeed have a blindspot which concerns the
way in which truth figures in internal  reflection upon a system of beliefs,  e.g.,  1st-
person reflection upon one’s own system of belief. For the most part Rorty exclusively
focuses  upon  truth  and  justification  as  norms  of  belief  maintenance  in  a  critical
communal setting; and even when he accepts that there are other contexts in which
the question of truth is at issue he tends to model them on justification to one’s peers.
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Rorty on the Normativity of Justification
4 In  articulating his  own pragmatist  account of  truth as  a  “convenient  friction” that
makes  disagreements  matter,  Huw  Price  argues  that  Rorty  –  whose  anti-
representationalist outlook inspired his own – has a blindspot about the normativity of
truth.5 In particular, Price accuses Rorty of failing to acknowledge that truth is a third
norm apart from the norms of sincerity and personal justification. As a consequence,
Price claims,  Rorty is  unable to make sense of  the idea that  an individual  speaker,
warranted  by  her  own  lights,  could  improve her  commitments  by  consulting  the
commitments and justificatory practices of  the community.  Or,  rather,  to bring the
argument directly to bear on Rorty: Rorty is unable to make sense of the idea that
communal  justification,  which  is  warranted  by  its  own  lights,  could  improve  its
commitments by consulting the commitments of a broader better informed or more
critically astute community.
5 It is worth observing that Price’s objection cannot be that Rorty refuses to admit that
truth plays some normative role or other. Rorty follows Davidson in holding that the
concept of truth is part of a package-deal of concepts including belief and meaning that
is required to make sense of the idea of rational agents rationally responsive to both
their natural-causal and social-linguistic environments. Truth is a norm at least in the
sense that it is a standard in terms of which we assess beliefs. That is the insight in the
thought that belief “aims at” the truth. Criticizing a belief by saying “That’s not true”
or praising a belief by saying “That’s true” have prima facie normative implications:
the first puts some pressure on the believer to give up the belief or at least to defend it
with appropriate reasons;  the latter  gives some (additional)  reason to stand by the
belief  in  the  face  of  criticism.  Rorty  calls  these  respectively  dis-endorsing  and
endorsing uses of the term “true.”
6 Price’s criticism, then, cannot be that truth for Rorty plays a purely disquotational role
without any normative import – a criticism he has levelled at Paul Horwich.6 Rather
what Price objects to is Rorty’s view that truth is not a distinct norm whose function is
independent of that of justification. Rorty takes it that the normative role of truth can
be exhaustively spelled out in terms of norms of communal justification, actual and
possible. Justification is, on Rorty’s view, our best criterion for what counts as true but
he admits that the latter is not reducible to the former. As Rorty puts it, “Granted that
‘true’ is an absolute term [in so far as truth is not relative to purposes, times or places],
its conditions of application will always be relative [in so far as justification is relative
to  purposes,  times  and  places].”7 So  Rorty  understands  the  endorsement  or
disendorsement of a belief as true, or not, as a way of expressing whether the belief in
question is accepted as appropriately justified in one’s community. Rorty’s attitude to
the normativity of truth is summed up in the following remarks:
The only difference between truth and justification which makes […] a difference is,
as far as I can see, the difference between old audiences and new audiences […] 
I think that, once one has explicated the distinction between justification and truth
by that between present and future justifiability, there is little more to be said.8 
7 Apart from disquotational and endorsing uses of the term “true” Rorty recognizes a
cautionary use in such expressions as “Your belief is fully justified but it may not be
true.” Of the three uses of the word “true” the cautionary use is the only indispensable
one. But, as one might expect, Rorty refuses to see this as granting any independent
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normative status to the concept of truth. He interprets cautionary uses of “true” in
terms of a distinction between what is justified according to current communal norms
and what is justified according to an idealized community: one that is better-informed,
more demandingly critical or richly imaginative than ours. Idealization here is to be
understood as idealization from the perspective of our current lights; it is idealization
without  a  transendent  ideal  or  limit  concept.  Rorty’s  incrementalist  progressive
approach to justification only requires that we can always imagine the possibility of an
improvement in our standards of belief-formation and assessment.9 But this is precisely
what Price argues Rorty is not entitled to assume without the addition of a distinctive
norm of truth. 
 
A Rortian Response to Price
8 As we have seen,  Price  argues that  Rorty’s  norm of  communal  warranted  assertibility
suffers the same fate as the norm he calls personal warranted assertibility, namely, that
without a distinct norm of truth neither norm can make sense of improvements in
one’s  epistemic  standing  whether  in  terms  of  the  actual  community  or  future
extensions and improvements of it. But this alleged incoherence is based on treating
the norm of communal warranted assertibility as a static norm rather than the
revisable update-able norm that Rorty intends. Price treats satisfaction of both norms
of warranted assertibility as equivalent to getting full marks on an exam – a model
which,  of  course,  leaves  no room for  improvement.  But  a  better  analogy would  be
determining the number of moons of Jupiter with Galileo’s telescope – a case that
allows that a bigger better telescope might be capable of finding more moons; and so
providing a better answer to the question. 
9 Price’s misreading here is closely related to a familiar misinterpretation of Rorty as
having a majoritarian conception of justification according to which one is justified in a
belief if it would be accepted by a majority of one’s communal peers.10 This majoritarian
reading would indeed make allowance for one to meet the norm of justification in a
given community – by being part of its majority opinion – without caring in the least
about a different consensus within another better informed community. In that case
Price’s  criticism  that  there  would  be  no  normative  pressure  to  improve  would  go
through. It  is in virtue of more or less the same argument that Price motivates his
introduction of a distinct norm of truth to make disagreements matter. 
10 To  get  Rorty  straight  here  we  need  to  draw  a  distinction  between  a  static (say,
majoritarian)  and  a  progressive  perfectionist conception  of  communal  norms.
Perfectionist  norms of  justification are  implicit  in  our  practices  of  inquiry:  that  is,
norms  of  justification  that  appeal  to  our  best  information,  our  best  investigative
techniques  and  our  best  arguments.  Such  norms  are  not,  for  Rorty,  a  matter  of
counting heads within a fixed well-defined group but, rather, doing the best we can
along the dimensions of information, investigation and argument wherever, whenever
and however we can. What we count as best, of course, changes as we acquire more and
better  information,  more  and  better  investigative  techniques  and  more  and  better
arguments.11 
11 It is important to note, in addition, and in spite of some of Rorty’s rhetoric, that the
relevant notion of community is  not to be understood in general as a more or less
stable cultural or political entity but as a plastic epistemic one defined for each specific
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subject matter in terms of those whose information, and techniques of investigation
and arguments are most relevant for the case at hand.12 For example, if it is a question
about the sub-structure of the atom then researchers who work in physics departments
and laboratories around the world contribute to determining what we count as best
justified on the matter. If it is a question about the artistic value of a painting then
those with experience and good judgment about paintings (those with, as we say, “good
taste” in this visual art) are part of the relevant community of peers.
12 Another way to make the same point is  to see that Rorty’s deference to communal
norms of justification is a version of Dewey’s theory of inquiry – itself a liberalization of
Peirce’s  theory.  It  is  well-known that  Peirce treats  beliefs  as  part  of  a  default-and-
challenge structure of truth-commitments.13 On this model one is default entitled to a
belief  that is  part  of  one’s  evolving worldview unless and until  there is  some good
reason  to  doubt  it.  Peirce  appeals  to  what  he  calls  (somewhat  misleadingly)  “the
scientific  method of inquiry” as the best means to settle opinion on some disputed
matter.14 On  Dewey’s  elaboration  of  this  approach  “the  scientific  method”  is
understood as a form of democratic experimentalism, a set of quasi-moral quasi-political
principles of virtuous inquiry combined with a fallibilist experimental attitude that is
just as applicable to art criticism and moral or political dilemmas as to problems in
chemistry,  economics  and  paleontology.  The  scientific  method  in  this sense  is  not
exclusively a method of  the successful  empirical  sciences,  just  one that the natural
sciences  happen  to  best  exemplify.  On  this  view,  beliefs  are  to  be  understood  as
justified in  terms of  perfectionist  epistemic norms implicit  in  our  best  practices  of
inquiry where the implicit reference to a “we” is understood in terms of expertise or
good  taste  or  some  other  normatively-laden  grouping  based  on  relevant  training,
experience and good judgment. 
13 A person who meets the norms of communal warranted assertibility within a particular
community is, contrary to Price’s criticism, put under immediate normative pressure to
adjust or change his or her views in light of better information and argument and more
critically robust methods of inquiry. Consequently, Price’s criticism of Rorty misses its
target  since  it  is  aimed  at  a  static  view  of  communal  justification  of  which
majoritarianism about justification is one familiar example. 
14 Nonetheless, although Rorty can avoid Price’s criticism, I now want to argue that there
remains a residual problem for his conception of the normative role of truth – even if




15 On Rorty’s view while truth cannot be reduced to justification, justification is our best
criterion for truth. Or, more fully, justification within the relevant epistemic community
is  our  best  criterion  for  truth.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  on  the  basis  of  appropriate
justification that we count something as true. And while truth is a normative notion in
so far as it is a standard according to which beliefs are assessed it is not a distinctive
norm since we must often appeal to our norms of justification to determine what it
true. It is for this reason that Rorty denies that truth is an independently identifiable
goal of inquiry at which we might aim. If we can only determine truth by way of what is
best justified and what is best justified is, as Rorty puts it, “an ever-retreating goal”15 –
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in so far as it is likely, based on a plausible induction from the past, that we will in the
future discover more and better information, arguments, and criticism – then there is
no fixed something called “truth” for inquiry to locate and aim at.
16 But even if we accept this general picture of truth there still remains a question about
whether  the  normative  function  of  truth  is  exhausted  by  appeal  to  the  norms  of
communal  justification.  We  can  approach  this  matter  by  considering  the  following
passage in which Rorty is discussing the term “true”:
I see no significance in the fact that we use the same word to designate what is
preserved by valid inference as we use to caution people that beliefs justified to us
may not be justified to other, better, audiences.16 
17 Here Rorty distinguishes two different jobs that truth does for us: 1) to single out what
is preserved in valid inference (by which I take him to mean valid argument); and 2) to
caution  people  that  no  matter  how  well  justified  they  are  it  is  possible  that  this
justification may not hold for a better informed more critically sophisticated audience.
In the outward perspective of inquiry truth is a norm regulating the formation of new
beliefs, the answering of new questions, the resolution of new doubts. In these sorts of
cases  Rorty  argues  that  both  the  endorsing  and  cautionary  uses  of  truth  can  be
plausibly interpreted in terms of norms of justification to one’s peers: in the first case
one expresses solidarity with the norms of justification of one’s interlocutor(s); and in
the second case one imagines a contrast between conforming to the norms of one’s
actual community and those of a better one, at least from the epistemic perspective. 
18 When  Rorty  considers  the  question  of  truth’s  normativity  he  tends  to  focus  his
attention almost exclusively on the perspective of inquiry where the question concerns
justifying one’s beliefs to one’s peers in the setting of a communal activity. What this
shows is that although Rorty is careful not to reduce the concept of truth to that of
justification or verification (as he is often accused of doing17) he does have a tendency
to reduce the normativity of truth to the normativity of justification to one’s peers. 18
Whatever normativity truth has is, on Rorty’s view, borrowed from that of justification
and idealizations of  such. That there is  a blind-spot here is  evident,  I  take it,  from
Rorty’s  inability  to  see  the  connection  between  the  truth-preservingness  of  valid
implication – what we might think of as the systematicity of truth – and the question
whether our ostensible beliefs are sufficiently justified to form part of our system of
truth-commitments.19 That is, both valid implication and justification play important
roles  in  the  maintenance  and  revision  of  a  world-view  understood  as  an  evolving
system of truth-commitments rationally responsive to each other and to the empirical
world. 
19 The normativity  of  truth is  not,  as  Rorty  often seems to  suppose,  reducible  to  the
normativity  of  justification.  To see this  consider  that  in  order  to  have a  system of
beliefs at all our truth-commitments must be bound by a rational norm of consistency.
20 Of course, we must not think of this as merely a linguistic norm concerning speech
acts for it is equally applicable to unexpressed beliefs or judgments. We may put the
norm as follows:
20 Norm of  Consistency:  If  one judges that  not-P and also  judges  that  P  –  or  there is  a
plausible inference from one’s current beliefs to the conclusion that P – then one must
adjust one’s commitments to remove the inconsistency.
21 Complying with the norm of consistency is something that we require of any rational
system of beliefs or truth-commitments – this is part of what makes it rational. And,
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significantly, when reflecting upon our beliefs we do not suppose that we can treat this
norm as a matter of justification to one’s peers. One must comply with this norm quite
independently of any question of justification for specific commitments. For example, it
applies to beliefs that one did not form on the basis of deliberation as well as to beliefs
one continues to hold despite having forgotten the basis or justification upon which
one came to believe them. And where conflicting beliefs are held it tells us that we
cannot continue to hold both beliefs prior to any comparison of the relative strength of
their respective justifications, supposing that we are aware of such. 
22 The norm of consistency is a principle of belief revision related to reasoned change in
view in contrast to the law of non-contradiction (i.e. it is not the case that P and that
not-P) which is a matter of formal logic.  The norm of consistency concerns rational 
inference, what it is reasonable or not to believe in light of what one already believes,
rather than simply logical implication, what logically follows from what – which puts
constraints on the structure of our truth-commitments without prescribing what to
believe.21 Following the norm of consistency is part of what is required to achieve the
rational integration of one’s truth-commitments.22 In so far as one has a world-view
that  is  inferentially  articulated (constrained though not  determined by the  laws of
logic)  and rationally  responsive to  the empirical  world (including the social  world)
then, as Gil Harman puts it, “one always has a reason to avoid inconsistency.”23 
23 The norm of consistency, which is better understood in terms of avoiding inconsistency
if and when it arises rather than of striving for consistency, applies at the social level
too.24 For example, consider Price’s norm of truth:
24 Norm of Truth: if Not-P then it is incorrect to assert that P; if Not-P there are prima facie
grounds for censure of an assertion that P. 
25 This  can  be  understood as  a  social  version  of  the  norm of  consistency,  one  which
presupposes a notion of social reason and a normative demand to achieve a unified
world-view amongst  fellow speakers  (or,  at  a  minimum, fellow speakers  within the
same field or specialization) within a society – at least about matters where we do not
tolerate  “no-fault  disagreements.”25 Such  a  norm  may  be  thought  to  function  as  a
regulative ideal  of  human communicative practices.  Again,  it  seems right to say,  as
Price does, that the normative force of the norm of truth, as he calls it, does not depend
on any specific considerations of justification for given commitments. But that is not to
say that Rorty is wrong to deny that truth is an additional norm of the sort that Price
imagines, one wholly distinct from justification. 
26 What it shows is that Rorty routinely mischaracterizes the normativity of truth. The
problem can be traced to Rorty’s inability to see why truth should be involved in both
logical implication and justification to one’s peers (especially when we caution others
that  what  is  justified  to  them  might  not  be  justified  to  other  better  informed
audiences).26 What Rorty is seeing, I suggest, is only one half of the Janus-faced relation
between  truth  and  reason.  By  focusing  exclusively  on  the  public  reason-giving
dimension of  the  relation  Rorty  misses  its  personal  or  reflective  dimension.  Public
justification that provides reasons to support a commitment (perhaps as a response to a
question or doubt)  is  the external  face of  reason in its  maintenance of  a  relatively
stable world-view in a context of disputes, disagreements and arguments. But there is
also the internal face of reason in 1st-personal or social reflection on the unity of one’s
(or our) world-view which shows up as a demand for consistency (that is, a demand to
eliminate inconsistency) in one’s (or our) thinking quite independently of matters of
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justification to one’s peers or even justification to oneself in self-reflection. To come to
appreciate  that  two  truth-commitments  are  inconsistent,  either  because  they  are
logically inconsistent (in so far as they cannot both be true together) or because there
is a plausible argument to that conclusion, is to see that one or the other must be given
up. It is a further question whether one has any better justification for one than for the
other. 
27 Notwithstanding this blindspot, Rorty’s does have a genuine insight, namely, that truth
is not “an additional norm” that we might have done without.27 This is the mistake
Price arguably makes. Over-generalizing Wittgenstein’s comparison of the functions of
words with “tools in a toolbox” Price conceives of our ordinary concept of truth as a
tool that makes disagreements matter – a tool designed for a specific function that we
can  imagine  having  done  without.28 To  highlight  this  instrumental  approach,  Price
devises a thought-experiment according to which there is a so-called Mo’an tribe whose
members enjoy speech and reason and conform to the norms of subjective assertibility
(sincerity) and personal warranted assertibility (justification by one’s own lights) which
he elucidates thus: 
28 Subjective Assertibility: A speaker is incorrect to assert that P if she does not believe that
P; to assert that P in these circumstances provides prima facie grounds for censure, or
disapprobation.
29 Personal Warranted Assertibility: A speaker is incorrect to assert that P if she does not
have  adequate  (personal)  grounds  for  believing  that  P;  to  assert  that  P  in  these
circumstances provides prima facie grounds for censure.
30 What Mo’ans lack is the concept of truth. By picturing Mo’an practices before and after
the introduction of the concept of truth Price aims to isolate and identify the function
of truth and the difference it makes to our practices. In a more sophisticated version of
the thought-experiment, Mo’ans are granted a truth predicate, but lack “the norm of
truth.” Their “truth” predicate operates as a mere device of disquotation without any
normative  force.  As  Price  imagines  it,  Mo’ans in  this  scenario  have  a  practice  of
expressing merely opinionated assertions (from whence their name is derived) which do
not critically engage with one another – much like personal preferences for food (e.g.
dark chocolate) or drink (e.g. guinness).
31 An  immediate  problem  with  Price’s  thought  experiment  is  that  it  is  obviously
incoherent – a point Price himself now concedes.29 All the key terms in which Price
describes the Moans prior to having the concept of truth – such as opinion, disagreement, 
assertion – simply presuppose the concept of truth. For example, to be of the opinion
that p is to take p to be true. To disagree with someone about their assertion that p is to
take p to be false. And the same point applies to the more sophisticated version of the
thought-experiment too: all the terms in which the Mo’ans are described presuppose a
normative concept of truth rather than a merely disquotational one. So a disagreement
that  did  not  put  some prima facie  pressure  upon one  to  defend  one’s  belief  or  to
criticize one’s interlocutor’s contrary belief would not be a disagreement at all but, at
best,  a  mere  difference.  Consequently,  the  threat  of  vicious  circularity  that  Price
acknowledges,  vitiates  his  thought  experiment  and  its  explanatory  point.30 The
description of the Mo’ans before they have the normative concept of truth is one that
simply presupposes what it is being used to explain i.e. the normative concept of truth. 
32 That the Mo’an thought-experiment is more or less obviously incoherent shows that
truth cannot be treated instrumentally as a stand-alone norm fulfilling a distinctive
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function  which  might  be  sensibly  substracted  from  and  then  added  to  linguistic
practice in the way Price supposes.31 As Rorty, following Davidson, saw, truth is part of
a package-deal of fundamental concepts including reason, meaning and belief no one of
which can be explained without invoking the others. Truth is implicated in the very
ascription of beliefs and meanings to speakers – rational agents with communicative
intentions  –  given the  principle  of  charity  in  interpretation  that  implies  a  general
presumption of rationality when interpreting another speaker.
33 Consequently, an important moral of the Price-Rorty exchange for a neo-pragmatist
approach to truth is that it is a mistake to treat truth as doing “a distinctive job” in our
thought  and  talk  that  we  might  imagine  having  done  without.32 One  cannot
instrumentalize truth as if it were an isolable tool performing a function in terms that
do not  presuppose  it.  Despite  Rorty’s  blindspot  about  the  normativity  of  truth,  his
awareness of the deep and inextricable embeddedness of truth in our linguistic and
interpretative practices – which undermines Price’s Mo’an thought-experiment – is an
important insight that survives criticism. 
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NOTES
1. McDowell (2000: 109-22).
2. Putnam (1992: 67-71). 
3. In response to McDowell (2000), Rorty can agree that a disquotational use of the term “true”
may also be an endorsing use – without glossing that in terms of answerability to the world.
Whether it is necessarily so, as McDowell argues, is something for further debate. And in response
to Putnam, Rorty distinguishes ethnocentrism – the view that our thought and talk is inevitably
embedded in a cultural and social context – from relativism about truth. It is only the former
view that he endorses. See Rorty (1993). 
4. Habermas (2000: 32) writes, “Rorty assimilates truth to justification at the expense of everyday
realist intuitions.”
5. Price (2010).
6. Price (2010: 167).
7. Rorty (1998: 2).
8. Rorty (2000: 4-5).
9. Somewhat surprisingly, Rorty’s account of justification is analogous to Peirce’s incrementalist
convergence account of truth which Rorty roundly criticizes. In both accounts there is a tension
between present commitment and possible future revision. In Rorty this is the tension between
the endorsing use of “true” underwritten by current standards of justification and the cautionary
use of “true” underwritten by possibly better standards in the future. For Peirce, truth is what
stands up to present scrutiny (hence we can endorse what now looks satisfactory to believe by
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our current lights) but it must also stand up to future scrutiny (hence we might be mistaken in
what we now take to be true although we hope that we are not).
10. This  is  how  Putnam,  e.g.,  reads  Rorty  on  the  ground  that,  for  Rorty,  justification  is  a
sociological matter. See Putnam (2000: 84).
11. Rorty appeals to “curiosity,” and “concrete fears of regression” in order to explain what
motivates one to engage in further inquiry even if  one has satisfied communal  standards of
justification. Rorty (2000: 17, 61).
12. Rorty speaks of “justifying our belief to the audience we think relevant (perhaps our own
intellectual conscience, or our fellow-citizens, or the relevant experts)” (ibid.: 56). In referring to
an “epistemic community” I am aware that pragmatists politicize epistemology in so far as the
theory of inquiry concerns a community of inquirers ideally operating according to relations of
trust, openness, sincerity, respect, and toleration. 
13. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief.”
14. I  have discussed this notion of scientific method as a method that is not exclusive to the
sciences and defended its philosophical importance against Rorty’s criticisms in “A Kant-Inspired
Conception of Pragmatism as Democratic Experimentalism” (2015).
15. Rorty  (1995:  298).  Rorty’s  point  here  expands into  an argument  against  Misak’s  Peircian
account of true belief as “a belief that could not be improved upon, a belief that would forever
meet the challenges of reasons, argument and evidence” (Misak 2000: 49). Another more succinct
formulation: “A true belief is a permanently settled or indefeasible belief” (Misak 2006: 7). To
identify true belief with indefeasible belief in this way is to make truth hostage to fortune and put
it out of reach of our practices – an unintended unpragmatic consequence. Since in any given
case one cannot know whether a putatively true belief will meet all the challenges of reasons,
argument and evidence in the future then we cannot claim it to be true now. We simply have no
way  of  knowing  whether  a  belief  is  indefeasible  or  not.  Rorty’s  alternative,  to  say  that
justification is the criterion of truth, without identifying truth with anything, allows one to take
hold  of  truths  in  the  present;  and  it  allows  for  the  fallible  updating  of  truths  as  one’s
justifications change for the better as a result of better reasons, argument and evidence.
16. Rorty (1995: 286).
17. For example, even Misak, who is more careful than most in this regard, claims that “[Rorty]
asserts that ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ are merely labels for what our peers will let us get away with
saying.” Although the passage that Misak is paraphrasing is Rorty at his most rhetorical, she
leaves out the crucial  qualification “ceteris  paribus” in the original  text  i.e. Rorty (1979:  176).
Misak (2013: 30).
18. Occasionally, Rorty demonstrates an awareness that there is more to the normativity of truth
than that. Consider this passage: “The need to justify our beliefs and desires to ourselves and to
our fellow-agents subjects us to norms, and obedience to these norms produces a behavioural
pattern which we must detect in others before confidently attributing any beliefs to them. But
there seems to be no occasion to look for obedience to an additional norm, the commandment to
seek the truth. For […] obedience to that commandment will produce no behaviour not produced
by the need to offer justification.” (1995: 287). 
What I  want to draw attention to is Rorty’s awareness that we justify beliefs and desires “to
ourselves.” But the insight is  immediately obscured since Rorty treats the 1st-person case of
reflection  on  the  model  of  justification  within  a  community  of  peers:  that  is,  one’s  own
“intellectual conscience” is considered to be an audience that one must convince. But there are
important differences between the 1st-person deliberative case of making up one’s mind and
providing justification to others: 1) others can simply not listen in a way that has no analogue in
one’s own reflections; 2) in the case of a genuine audience one is not in a position to make up
their minds for them no matter how overwhelming the justifications might seem to us; and 3) in
the 1st-person case it can be responsible to maintain a belief that one already holds even if one
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does  not  know what  would  justify  it.  If  one  already  believes  then  justification  to  oneself  is
irrelevant.
19. Rorty (1998: 25, fn 23).
20. We could also speak of this as a “logical” norm if we understand this term in the broad sense
that Wittgenstein uses it when he speaks of his philosophical investigations as concerning “the
logic of language,” e.g. (2009: § 93).
21. For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  importance  of  the  distinction  between  inference and
implication see Gil Harman’s Change in View (1986). Note, too, that in the quoted passage on p. 8
Rorty uses the term “inference” for what I am calling “implication”.
22. This is what Kant, from a “pure” a priori perspective (that a pragmatist would want to bring
down to earth), calls the “transcendental unity of apperception” (2000: B139).
23. Harman (1986: 56). 
24. Kant, e.g., recognizes social and personal dimensions of the norm of consistency. Two of the
three maxims of “the common human understanding” (sensus communis) are: “always to think in
accord with [or consistently with] oneself”; and “to think in the position of everyone else” (2000
5: 294). 
25. This  is  Price’s  expression  (e.g. 2011: 47).  It  might  be  better  to  speak  of  “no-blame
disagreements” since one might not blame another for thinking what one takes to be false in,
say, aesthetic, moral or political matters given their different sensibility, upbringing, self-image
(etc.). But one might still find fault in the sense that one thinks they are missing something.
Cavell calls such cases matters of “rational disagreement” which registers the fact that there can
be, in a sense, equally legitimate but conflicting rational responses to an artwork or a moral or
political conundrum. Cavell (1979: 254).
26. Rorty (1998: 25, fn 23).
27. Price (2011: 164). 
28. Wittgenstein remarks: “Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a
screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as
the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)” (2009: § 11). 
29. Price (2010). Price is unfazed by the admission since he appeals to the incoherence as itself a
demonstration that truth plays the distinctive normative role of “making disagreements matter”
that the Mo’an thought experiment was originally intended to isolate. But all  he is entitled to
conclude from the incoherence of the case of the Mo’ans is that the concept of truth (including its
normative dimension) is not independent of the concepts (hence the normativity) of justification,
belief, assertion, reason, and meaning.
30. Price  admits  that  “circularity  threatens”  in  various  places  in  his  account  of  the  Mo’ans 
although it also seems clear that he originally believed that it could be avoided (2011: 176, fn 17). 
31. Price’s instrumentalist assumption that truth performs a distinctive stand-alone function is
clear from his attempt “to imagine a linguistic practice which had those norms [of sincerity and
personal justification] but not truth. By seeing what such a practice lacks we see what truth
adds” (2011: 168). As originally conceived Price was of the view that if we subtracted the norm of
truth we would still be left with intelligible linguistic practices, albeit “radically different” (ibid.:
166). He remarks: “Without truth the wheels of argument do not engage; disagreements slide
past one another” (ibid.: 179). But all we are entitled to say here is that without truth there would
be no such thing as argument or disagreement. 
32. (Ibid.: 174).
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ABSTRACTS
Criticisms of Rorty’s view of truth are so frequent and from such sagacious sources that it is
reasonable to suspect that there must be some truth in them. But what? In this paper I consider
perhaps the strongest form of such criticism, Huw Price’s claim that without a distinct norm of
truth Rorty is  unable  to  make sense of  how someone,  justified by her own lights  (say,  local
communal standards), could improve her commitments by reference to another better informed
community. My aim in the present paper is twofold: In the first place, I shall argue that Price’s
criticism is  off-target  missing  the  perfectionist  character  of  the  justificatory  norms that  are
criterial for truth on Rorty’s account. Secondly, I argue that Rorty’s actual blindspot concerns the
way  in  which  truth  figures  in  internal  reflection  upon  a  system  of  beliefs,  e.g.,  1st-person
reflection upon one’s own beliefs. But this blindspot should not blind us to the lasting insight in
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